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Abstract 
The amount of uploaded extremist propaganda on the internet is increasing. In particular, 
right-wing extremist as well as Islamic extremist groups take advantage of the opportunities presented 
by the internet to spread their ideas to worldwide masses. Both tackle in-group specific topics and 
address their audiences in their respective political, national or religious identities. Several factors, 
such as higher levels of authoritarian value orientations and threatening life situations (such as 
existential threats or psychological uncertainty) have been found to shape people’s reactions towards 
radical groups as well as to propaganda. The current study investigated whether the response to 
extremist propaganda videos (namely, aversion felt for the video and the perceived persuasiveness of 
the video) is shaped by an individual’s authoritarian attitudes and psychological uncertainty and 
whether this is a global process or in-group specific. Further, it considered the effects of exposure to 
extremist propaganda on the identification with one’s in-group. In a laboratory experiment, German 
students were confronted with a right-wing extremist and an Islamic extremist video after 
manipulating their level of uncertainty (high vs. low levels of psychological uncertainty).  The results 
confirmed that the interaction between authoritarianism and psychological uncertainty affected the 
evaluation of right-wing extremist videos addressing participants’ national in-group. Under conditions 
of uncertainty, authoritarianism predicted less aversion and a higher persuasiveness of these videos. 
Further, psychological uncertainty increased the identification with participants’ German nationality, 
irrespective of authoritarian attitudes. Notably, the effect was in-group bound: The same effect was not 
found for Islamic extremist propaganda referring to a religious out-group. The results are discussed 
regarding the potential of propaganda to foster behavioral intentions and engagement in extremist 
groups in specific threatening situations.  
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Introduction  
     
“There is no such uncertainty as a sure thing.”  
(Robert Burns, cf. Platt, 1989) 
 
Extremist movements are on the rise, and not just in Europe. Radical xenophobic 
political movements such as the “Old School Society” or “the Identitarian Movement” (“die 
Identitäre Bewegung”) in Germany, and religious extremist groups such as the so-called 
Islamic state (IS) promote their ideas and aim at recruiting new members via propagandistic 
videos on the internet. The increasing number of such propaganda videos (Glaser, 2013; 
O'Callaghan, Greene, Conway, Carthy & Cunningham, 2015; Winter, 2015) has aroused 
public attention, created mass media reports and alerted global security agencies partly 
because interactions between extremists and their (yet to be) followers have been suggested to 
be an important factor for radicalization (Gill, Corner, Thornton, & Conway (2015). While 
propaganda of more extreme groups has accompanied the development of the internet since 
its beginning, web 2.0 functions offer its users the possibility to produce, upload, comment 
and distribute propaganda themselves. Mostly anonymously and in uncensored manner.  
Audio-visual propaganda is a particularly suitable tool for propagators to reach a 
global audience and to raise interest in their actions and the reasons behind. Hegghammer 
(2006), for instance, cited young Jihadists in Saudi Arabia who named extremist videos as one 
means to persuade them of the urgency to fight Jihad. Extremist video propaganda often 
appears professionally produced and right-wing extremists, as well as Islamic extremists, 
ascribe propaganda a central role as recruiting tool (Payne, 2009; Pfeiffer, 2003). For 
instance, the self-declared “Islamic state” invests substantial resources in the production of 
high-quality audiovisuals aimed at reaching a global audience (Stern & Berger, 2016). 
Contrary to the propagator’s aims, recent studies demonstrated that young adults 
evaluated propagandistic videos negatively and rated them as uninteresting and non-
persuasive (Rieger, Frischlich, & Bente, 2013). Nonetheless, the authors also revealed that 
higher levels of an individual’s authoritarian attitudes decreased this rejection of propaganda 
and fostered the interest in, and the perceived persuasiveness of, extremist propaganda videos. 
Authoritarian needs appear to be especially triggered in times of social threats or insecurity, 
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Birum, 2002). Authoritarianism is a social attitude (Duckitt, 2013) entailing the co-varying 
components of authoritarian submission (i.e. the willingness to obey to authorities), 
authoritarian aggression (i.e. the punishment of those who do not obey), and conservativism. 
Research showed that authoritarian attitudes increase under conditions of social threat. 
Students that imagined a future in which their country had experienced some years of 
economic decline and social desintegration, perceived the world as being more dangerous and 
this worldview increases authoritarian attitudes (see also Duckitt, 2013). 
Mass media reports that recent societal developments such as the Eurozone crisis and 
growing unemployment among young Europeans have jarred participants’ confidence in the 
stability and order of the European society (Schlamp, 2015). In Germany, right-wing populist 
(such as PEGIDA, or the party AfD) and extremist movements (such as the Old School 
Society) capitalize on this insecurity and fuel public fears; for instance, regarding refugees 
fleeing to Germany (Spiegel Online, 2015).  
Individuals seeking certainty, and who respond with authoritarian attitudes, have been 
found to identify more with their respective in-group (Chirumbolo, 2002). Identification, in 
turn, has been discussed to be a prerequisite for commitment and participation with an in-
group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). Through fostering political involvement (Huddy & 
Khatib, 2007) and behavioral intentions to become active (Ellemers et al., 1997), 
identification can therefore increase the likelihood for political participation (Fowler & Kam, 
2007). According to uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2000), uncertainty motivates 
individuals to identify with social groups that provide a distinctive “groupness”, a so-called 
entitative identity (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007), and that transmits 
clear behavioral norms (Hogg, 2014). Radical (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010) and 
extremist groups promise both entitativity (the distinction to all other groups) and clear 
behavioral norms. Hence, extremist groups can be particularly attractive as a source of 
uncertainty reduction (Hogg, 2014).  
The current study addressed the question of whether an individual’s authoritarian 
value orientation and psychological uncertainty shape the cognitive and emotional evaluation 
of right-wing extremist propaganda and foster national (German) identification. The study 
focused on the very first steps towards political participation in extremist movements, namely 
the circumstances under which extremist propaganda: a) can decrease people’s aversion to the 




Rieger; Frischlich & Bente: Propaganda in an insecure, unstructured world 
206 
identification with one’s own nationality (i.e. the in-group addressed in right-wing extremist 
videos).  
 
Extremism and Internet Propaganda 
 
Internet propaganda has changed from an instrument to convince the masses to an 
instrument used by the masses (O´Shaughnessy, 2012). Social networking sites (such as 
YouTube and Facebook), online forums, blogs and Instant Messenger Services enable 
everybody to produce, upload and distribute their own propaganda material (English, 
Sweetser, & Ancu, 2011; Holtz, Kronberger, & Wagner, 2012; O´Shaughnessy, 2012; 
O'Callaghan et al., 2015; Winter, 2015). Even the production of one’s own videos and films 
has become increasingly easy with the widespread availability of computers, cheap cameras 
and smartphones.  
Also extremist groups have discovered these benefits and use the internet as their new 
home-base and operational area (Hoffmann, 2006). In terms of audiovisual output, the two 
biggest of these virtual propagators are right-wing extremists and Islamic extremists. 
Strategists from both ideologies also claimed internet propaganda as a powerful tool in their 
“war over minds” (Stern & Berger, 2016; Weimann, 2006, p. 118). In Germany alone, there 
are thousands of online forums, blogs, social media offers and, particularly, videos that 
disseminate their ideologies  (Frankenberger, Glaser, Hofmann, & Schneider, 2015; Glaser, 
2013; Hussain & Saltman, 2014). They use the internet to communicate with their own people 
(in-group), their enemies (out-group), as well as to other internet users (potential in-group 
and global community) (Rieger et al., 2013).  
While in-group communication, such as training instructions or planning, is often 
uploaded in restricted areas such as closed forums (Busch, 2005), material for recruiting 
purposes is freely accessible on websites, social media applications and open discussion 
forums. Therefore the odds of stumbling over accordant material are high (Rieger et al., 
2013). Extremists’ digital communication has been described as “propaganda offensive” 
(Puschnerat, 2006), “attention-seeking terrorism” and the “marketing of fear” (Weichert, 
2007). Extremists aim at creating a strong virtual community via propaganda (Egerton, 2011; 
Engelmann et al., 2010), and to transmit “a concrete example of what the utopian 
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Moreover, the internet allows users to actively participate in the (extremist) 
movement. Often, neither the materials uploaded on websites like Wikipedia, YouTube, 
Twitter, MySpace or Facebook, nor the actions demanded are directly recognizable as 
extremist. For example, “liking” fan-sites against pedophilia on Facebook can also mean 
“liking” the National Socialist organization behind it, without (the user) even noticing.  
Videos that are uploaded on platforms like YouTube or shared via mobile phones play 
a significant role within the extremists’ web 2.0 offers (Connelly et al., 2016; Frankenberger 
et al., 2015). Based on previous literature and actual user data (YouTube, 2016a, YouTube, 
2016b), YouTube has been discussed as one of the most popular distribution channels for 
internet videos, also providing room for audiovisual propaganda and counter message 
material. Especially adolescents as heavy users of YouTube (Horizont, 2016) intentionally or 
non-intentionally may get exposed to propaganda via the video platform. Glaser (2013) 
reported that single right-wing extremist video clips can easily exceed 100,000 clicks. Audio-
visual propaganda appears to be very attractive and is able to reach high numbers of recipients 
(Seib & Janbek, 2011).  
 
Effects of Propaganda Videos 
 
Although the influence of propaganda has historically always been considered 
negative (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2012), the actual effects of audiovisual internet propaganda 
have only seldom been investigated experimentally. Hence, empirical information on the 
causal effects of propaganda exposure is scarce.  
Research in communication and media psychology demonstrates that media content 
can influence emotions, cognitions, knowledge and behaviors (Eveland & Schmitt, 2015; 
Schemer, 2012; Slater, 2007). That is not to say that extremist media content alone can be a 
major cause for radicalization to occur. Rather, propaganda might influence recipients’ 
emotions and cognitions.  
In the next part, we describe initial attempts to study the emotional and cognitive 
effects of propaganda which identified group membership, uncertainty and authoritarianism as 
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Group Membership and Propaganda Effects 
 
One of the first exploratory studies on the effects of extremist propaganda videos 
addressed the response of British Muslims towards Islamic extremist videos via a series of 
focus group discussions (Baines et al., 2010). The reactions of participants towards different 
propaganda videos ranged from avoidance to approach. Altogether, participants showed some 
understanding that others might be influenced by such video clips but rated their own 
persuasion by the videos as low. Addressing right-wing populist messages, Arendt (2015) 
found his participants explicitly denied the persuasive potential of right-wing populist 
campaigns. Only on the implicit level and after a high dose of comparable populist 
statements, individuals started to show associations in line with the campaign’s intent and 
associated foreigners more negatively.  
With regard to comparative analyses of the effects of propaganda messages from 
distinct ideologies, Rieger, et al. (2013) demonstrated that the general reaction to both right-
wing extremist as well as Islamic extremist videos was rejection. In particular, students 
evaluated propaganda directed towards their in-group (Right-wing extremism for Germans 
and Islamic extremism for Muslims) even more negatively than propaganda directed towards 
the respective other target audience. Their findings correspond to research on negative social 
identities (Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002) and 
studies on the black sheep effect. Individuals have been found to respond to norm-violating 
in-group members even more harshly than to norm-violating out-group members, as the 
rejection of black sheep helps them to  preserve an overall positive image of the group (Lewis 
& Sherman, 2010; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988).  
Relatedly, situational threats have been found to increase the acceptance of extremists 
and extremist propaganda. In a recent study, Frischlich, Rieger, Hein, & Bente (2015) showed 
that the salience of existential anxieties (namely the awareness of one’s own mortality) 
increased the interest in, and the perceived persuasiveness of, extremist propaganda directed 
towards the participants’ in-group. Propaganda directed towards a different target audience 
was not affected.  
The stronger rejection of potential in-group propaganda is mirrored in basic research 
showing that negative in-groups motivate people to distance themselves from them (Arndt, 
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belonging to the same national or religious group as an extremist propagator (a) activates 
negative social identity (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Branscombe, Fernández, Gómez, & 
Cronin, 2012); and (b) triggers strategies for dealing with this threat to the own identity. 
Strategy selection thereby varied with the recipient’s educational level (Rieger et al., 2013). 
Students distanced more from in-group than from out-group propaganda while pupils from 
vocational schools showed the reverse pattern. Results are compatible with studies showing 
that self-selected (professional) identities are preferred and thus ease distancing from not self-
selected negative in-groups (Ellemers, 2001). In sum, prior research indicates an overall 
negative evaluation of extremist propaganda and particularly harsh reactions towards 
propaganda addressing the recipient as in-group member.  
 
Authoritarianism, Uncertainty, and Propaganda Effects 
 
Beyond the effects of group membership, the studies by Rieger et al. (2013) have 
shown that authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988), or put differently, an authoritarian attitude, 
predicted a decreased derogation of extremist propaganda. Their findings are in line with 
research showing that authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1988) promotes a more favorable attitude 
towards in-groups, more negative attitudes towards out-group members and right-wing 
extremist attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Authoritarianism has long been known as 
predictor for prejudice (for a review, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), to predict right-wing 
extremist attitudes among pupils (Fuchs, 2003), police officers (Gatto & Dambrun, 2012; 
Gatto, Kerbrat, & Oliveira, 2010), soldiers (Altemeyer, 1988) and to foster the acceptance of 
violence (e.g., Arlin & Benjamin, 2006; Crowson, 2009).  
It is not surprising that an authoritarian value orientation increases the turning towards 
extremists who address the recipient as an in-group member. First studies on the relationship 
between authoritarianism and the evaluation of propaganda videos showed that higher 
authoritarian people tend to be less aversive towards in-group propaganda (Rieger et al., 
2013).  
As described in the introduction, authoritarian attitudes increase under conditions of 
social threats. While initial theories conceptualized authoritarianism as a stable personality 
trait (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), recent research highlights the 




Rieger; Frischlich & Bente: Propaganda in an insecure, unstructured world 
210 
authoritarian attitudes emerge when the world is perceived as threatening (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2010). Authoritarianism has been described as “flight into security” (Oesterreich, 2005, p. 0) 
motivating the turning towards one’s in-group (Duckitt et al., 2002). Compatible to this 
interaction between situational factors and individual attitudes, Ramírez and Verkuyten 
(2011) found Dutch participants tolerated a right-wing extremist rally in their hometown more 
when they valued order and safety and the speech was framed as freedom of speech. 
Noteworthy, the response was in-group bound: Dutch participants who valued order and 
safety did not evaluate the rally better (even when it was framed as freedom of speech) when 
it came from an Islamic extremist.  
Unfortunately, this study did not address the participants’ identification with their 
nation directly. This is problematic as identification has been found to crucially influence how 
individuals respond to, for instance, racist in-group members or past out-group aggressions by 
their in-group (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 
2005). Extremist propaganda aims at fostering in-group cohesion (Eatwell, 2006). An 
inspection of the effects of extremist propaganda on in-group identification thus seems 
desirable.  
According to uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2000; Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 
2010; Hogg, Meehan, et al., 2010; Hogg et al., 2007), uncertainty motivates group 
identification. Uncertainty is considered an uncomfortable state which people strive to reduce. 
Hogg (2000) argues group identification to be an effective tool in reducing uncertainty 
because it is associated with social categorization of the self and others – a process which can 
lead to a depersonalization of the self in order to conform to group prototypes which can 
render the world more predictable and less uncertain. The basic assumption underlying 
uncertainty-identity theory is that uncertainty triggers the process of identification with a self-
inclusive category, that people identify more strongly with groups when they feel uncertain 
and, in turn, that uncertainty-based identification reduces uncertainty (Hogg, 2000; Hogg et 
al., 2007; Mullin & Hogg, 1998; Reid & Hogg, 2005).  
Research on group identification under uncertainty demonstrated that some groups are 
better to identify with than others. Hogg et al. (2007) found that participants identified more 
strongly with groups in uncertain situations when the group was highly entitative. Highly 
entitative groups which rested on clear boundaries, perceived internal homogeneity, clear 
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uncertainty rose (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). Moreover, people even dis-
identified from low-entitativity groups that fostered diversity as they provide little to resolve 
the uncertainty (Hogg et al., 2007; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000).  
Extremist groups display a high level of entitativity to the outside (Kruglanski, Pierro, 
Mannetti, & De Grada, 2006). A group structured in this extreme way can be able to provide a 
very certain sense of the self in an uncertain world. Under higher levels of uncertainty, people 
prefer to identify with these groups (see Hogg, 2014 for a review of uncertainty and 
extremism ). Indeed, Hogg, Meehan et al. (2010) found that under higher uncertainty, the 
usual preference for moderate groups changed towards a strengthened identification with a 
radical group.  
Prior research already demonstrated uncertainty to increase identification with highly 
entitative groups. However, audio-visual propaganda directed towards a mass audience often 
aims at gaining support for their ideologies among non-extremist others sharing their national 
or religious identity (Payne, 2009). Extremists want to present themselves as speakers for “the 
Germans” or “the Muslims”, and yet most Germans and Muslims would never consider them 
as speaking for their group (Decker, Kiess, & Brähler, 2016; Frindte, Boehnke, Kreikenbronn, 
& Wagner, 2012). In consequence, an inspection of the role uncertainty plays for the general 
identification with the group extremists capitalize on seems necessary to understand 
propaganda effects beyond direct links between the consumption of a video and the attraction 
towards a radical party. 
Besides the effects on preferences for certain groups, Hogg, Meehan et al. (2010) 
discuss the relevance of this research and its impact on group actions, thus relating 
identification to political participation intentions:  
 
The most societally problematic feature of extremist or radical groups is precisely 
that their members identify strongly with a group that advocates and pursues 
radical actions. This action component of a group's identity is likely to become 
more important when what the group stands for is self-relevant and viewed as 
under threat. When, for example, people feel their security, prosperity, and 
lifestyle are under threat, they yearn to identify strongly with a group that can 
actually get things done to remove or buffer the threat—a radical group that has a 
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strengthen identification with assertive radical groups, perhaps transforming 
members into fanatics, zealots, true believers, and ideologues, and may also 
weaken identification with less assertive moderate groups. (p. 1062).  
 
Confirming these thoughts, the authors found an effect of identification with a more 
radical group and people’s intention to engage in specific group behaviors. These intentions 
were mediated by identification (Hogg, Meehan et al., 2010). One reason is because 
identification is associated with political involvement which motivates information-seeking 
and political participation (Huddy & Khatib, 2007). Additionally, Ellemers et al. (1997) 
provided evidence that people who highly identified with a group showed a stronger 
commitment to the group and its actions (see also Terry & Hogg, 1996). Expanding the 
traditional participation model, Fowler and Kam (2007) demonstrated that higher levels of 
social identification led to an increase in political participation. Thus, identification with the 
in-group addressed in a propaganda video can be regarded as a first small step towards joining 
an extremist group and even behaving according to their group standards.  
Based on the literature, we predicted that higher levels of authoritarianism would lead 
to a more favorable evaluation of propaganda videos addressed at the participants’ in-group 
(H1). In addition, higher levels of uncertainty were predicted to lead to a more favorable 
evaluation of propaganda videos directed towards the participant’s in-group (H2). 
Furthermore, we were particularly interested in the interaction of psychological uncertainty 
and authoritarianism and asked how this interaction would influence participants’ response 
towards extremist videos (RQ1). Finally, based on uncertainty-identity theory, we proposed 
that higher levels of uncertainty would lead to higher identification with the in-group 
addressed in the propaganda videos (H3).  
The current study is an initial approach to assess both the evaluation of right-wing 
extremist propaganda when individual factors (authoritarianism) and situational factors 
(psychological uncertainty) provide the possibility for a more favorable evaluation (H1, H2, 













Fifty-one male German students (Mage = 24.74, SD = 3.83) participated. We recruited 
only male participants because previous research reported male individuals to be 
overrepresented in in extremist groups and movements (Claus, Lehnert, & Müller, 2010; 
Sageman, 2008). We also ensured that all participants were German because previous 
research identified specific response patterns to propaganda depending on the cultural 
background of the participant4 (Frischlich, Rieger, Hein, et al., 2015; Rieger et al., 2013).  
 
Procedure 
First, participants filled out questionnaires which assessed their demographics (e.g. 
nationality, age, gender) and their level of authoritarianism (Petzel, Wagner, Nicolai, & Van 
Dick, 1997). To manipulate the variance of uncertainty, we followed the two-step procedure 
by Hogg, Meehan et al. (2010; Hogg et al., 2007). In step 1, participants read a newspaper 
article presented on the screen. Two different versions of the article were used in order to 
maximize variance within the level of induced uncertainty. Participants either read an article 
about prosperous future job chances for academics (n = 26) versus pessimistic job changes 
after completion of their studies (n = 25). In step 2, subjects were asked to write a short essay 
answering the following question “Please jot down which aspects this news article made you 
feel certain/uncertain about your own life and future” (Hogg, Meehan, et al., 2010).  
Afterwards, participants were guided to another room in which they saw a right-wing 
extremist propaganda video and an Islamic extremist video in randomized order. Each video 
was approximately two minutes long. The videos were taken from the database of extremist 
videos by Rieger et al. (2013) and had been categorized as Talking Head videos. The right-
wing extremist video showed three young right-wing extremists walking through the city of 
Frankfurt and explaining towards the camera the failures of the “system”, the government and 
the duties of “each German”. The Islamic extremist video shows a young Jihadi explaining in 
German the atrocities of Western invaders in Arab countries and the duties of “every Muslim” 
to fight Jihad against these invaders (Rieger et al., 2013). Before each video, participants were 
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reminded that they could abort the experiment at any time. After each video, participants 
filled out a questionnaire in which they evaluated the video. At the end, they were asked for 
their identification as Germans. Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed. The 
debriefing entailed a clear explanation of the real purpose of the study and the full 
experimental design but also provided some room for participants’ questions, e.g. regarding 




Authoritarianism. Authoritarianism was assessed with eight items (Petzel et al., 1997) on a 5-
point scale (e.g., “The most important thing, children should learn is obedience and respect 
for parents and superiors”, 1= “do not agree at all”, 5 = “totally agree”). Reliability was 
satisfactory α = .76.  
 
Uncertainty. As described, uncertainty was induced and measured using the procedure 
established by Hogg, Meehan et al. (2010). The assessment of psychological uncertainty was 
based on a single item asking participants to indicate how uncertain they felt on a 9-point 
scale5 .  
 
Aversion and Persuasiveness. The video’s felt aversion and perceived persuasiveness were 
measured using two scales developed by Rieger et al. (2013). Aversion was measured with 
three items (e.g., “I felt contempt”, α = .82). The persuasiveness scale consisted of four items 
(e.g., “The video was persuasive”, Cronbach’s α = .71). All items were answered on a 4-point 
scale (1 = totally disagree, 4 = totally agree). Seven additional items served as fillers. 
 
Identification. The identification measure was taken from Hogg, Meehan et al. (2010), asking 




                                                 
5 We relied on a single item to assess uncertainty (1) in order not to make the concept too salient to participants 








Manipulation Check and Initial Analyses 
A first analysis confirmed a successful manipulation. Participants with the uncertainty 
priming reported higher uncertainty (M = 4.16, SD = 1.93) than those without the uncertainty 
prime (M = 3.35, SD = 1.41). This difference was significant, t(49) = -1.71, p < .05 (one-
tailed).  
We conducted independent t-tests to analyze whether aversion and perceived 
persuasiveness of the right-wing extremist video would differ depending on the uncertainty 
group. Neither of these tests yielded a significant result (all ps > .53). Thus, we decided to 
take the full variance of uncertainty into account and calculated the main analyses with the 
continuous (9-point) uncertainty measure (Hogg, Meehan, et al., 2010).  
 
Main Analyses  
Three hierarchical regressions for the dependent variables persuasiveness, aversion 
and identification reported after the right-wing extremist video were performed6 (for an 
overview on the relations between the variables, see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
  M SD 1.  2.  3.  4.  5.  
1. Authoritarianism 2.07 0.66 - 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.22 
2. Uncertainty 3.75 1.72 
 
- 0.10 0.04 .49** 
3. Persuasiveness 1.27 0.36 
  
- -.33* 0.03 
4. Aversion 2.90 0.92 
   
- 0.07 
5. Identification 4.82 2.30         - 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
                                                 
6 To further check whether the assumed relationships between authoritarianism, uncertainty and the 
evaluation of propaganda is an in-group-specific process, we calculated two hierarchical regressions with the 
same predictors and aversion and perceived persuasiveness in response to the Islamic extremist video. Neither of 
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In each regression, the mean for authoritarianism was entered in step 1, the mean for 
uncertainty was entered in step 2 and the interaction between both was entered in step 3 (all z-
standardized).  
The regression for felt aversion indicated that the final model could explain 18% of 
variance (R² = .18, 95%-CI [.881; 1.840], based on 1,000 bootstrapping samples). The 
interaction between authoritarianism and uncertainty was the only significant predictor, B = -
.50, SE = .17, t = -2.97, p < .01, 95%-CI [-.845; -.161]. As this interaction points towards a 
moderation, it was further analyzed using the Johnson-Neyman technique. In doing so, one 
can detect so-called regions of significance for the moderation (Hayes & Matthes, 2009, p. 
928). These are values of the moderator variable where the effect of the focal predictor (in the 
present case, authoritarianism) is significant. Analyzing this interaction in detail, under 
conditions of low uncertainty (M ≤ 2.55, 29.15% of participants are below this value), 
authoritarianism had a positive effect on aversion reported after right-wing extremist 
propaganda. However, when uncertainty increased, the effects turned negative and under 
conditions of high uncertainty (M ≥ 5.44, 12.50% of participants are above this value), 
individuals with authoritarian attitudes responded with reduced aversion to right-wing 
extremist videos (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Interaction between authoritarianism and uncertainty on aversion reported 
after the propaganda video.  
 
Results for perceived persuasiveness revealed that the final model could explain 13% 
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interaction between authoritarianism and uncertainty was the only significant predictor, B = 
.15, SE = .07, t = 2.09, p < .05 (95%-CI [.008; .290].  
Again, using the Johson-Neyman technique, the region of significance for the 
moderator was found for higher levels of uncertainty (for M ≥ 4.80 the confidence bands are 
entirely above zero: 35.41% of participants are above this value): Authoritarianism had a 
negative – though not significant - effect on the persuasiveness ascribed to right-wing 
extremist propaganda among individuals with low levels of uncertainty. However, when 
uncertainty increased and passed the threshold, authoritarianism significantly predicted an 
increased persuasiveness ascribed to right-wing extremist videos (see Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction between authoritarianism and uncertainty on the perceived 
persuasiveness of the propaganda video.  
 
Finally, the regression for identification could explain 27% of variance (R² = .27, 
95%-CI [.743; 1.704], based on 1,000 bootstrapping samples). For identification, the only 
significant predictor was the level of uncertainty, B = 1.11, SE = .31, t = 3.57, p = .001, 95%-
CI [.481; 1.728]. The higher the level of uncertainty, the more a participant identified with 













The current study aimed at addressing the role of authoritarian value orientations 
(authoritarianism) and psychological uncertainty for the response towards current extremist 
propaganda videos and generated several findings of interest. First of all, uncertainty and 
authoritarianism conjointly decreased the derogation of right-wing extremist propaganda as 
aversive and fostered the perceived persuasiveness of the propaganda video. Highly relevant, 
the positive relation between authoritarianism and the attraction towards extremist ideologies 
such as transported within propaganda videos was fueled by psychological uncertainty. While 
under conditions of low uncertainty, authoritarianism even increased the rejection of extremist 
groups, potentially due to their challenge of the current social order; under conditions of 
higher uncertainty, the advantages of the clear worldview transmitted by extremist 
propaganda seemed to outweigh these disadvantages for individuals with authoritarian 
attitudes. In addition, uncertainty increased the identification with the national group 
addressed by the extremist propagator, irrespective of the authoritarian attitudes of the 
recipient.  
Uncertainty emerged as a relevant factor for the identification with the national group- 
matching mass media concerns that insecurities fueled by right-wing extremists could 
motivate un-radicalized citizens to shift to the right (Spiegel Online, 2015). The results 
thereby underline prior studies on the role of existential threats on the persuasiveness of 
extremist propaganda (Frischlich, Rieger, Hein, et al., 2015) and the role of uncertainty for the 
turning towards extremist groups (for a review, see Hogg, 2014). Further, this study provides 
additional evidence for the idea that the response to propaganda is an in-group specific effect 
with in-group specific vulnerabilities (see Rieger et al., 2013). Calculating the same analyses 
for responses towards the Islamic extremist videos did not yield significant associations.  
Based on general ideas on how to move the masses, interest in a group, its persuasive 
appeal and identification with it are important steps towards action (Ellemers et al., 1997). 
The results therefore also conceptualize the ways in which young adults are brought to 
politically participate in extremist groups by means of extremist internet propaganda. For 
political participation to take place, identification can be considered a necessary prerequisite; 
one the one hand for political involvement with a topic (Huddy & Khatib, 2007) and, on the 
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Hogg, Meehan et al., 2010). Terry and Hogg (1996) found that intentions to engage in the 
actions of a group only increased when identification was high. Since propaganda videos 
explicitly aim at addressing still inactive audiences and at recruiting new members (Holtz et 
al., 2012; Rogan, 2007), they can be considered a first gateway to increase identification with 
extreme groups and thereby could become a fruitful tool in mobilizing the audience towards 
participation in group actions. 
Research further suggested that people distance themselves from negative examples of 
their in-group (Arndt et al., 2002). In light of research in the context of uncertainty-identity 
theory (Hogg, 2000), people tend to prefer more radical groups when they are uncertain and 
dis-identify with more moderate groups. Relatedly, Ellemers and colleagues (1997) discuss 
the idea that identification and less permeable group boundaries are related to engaging in 
group actions and sticking to the group instead of changing the group. In the context of 
propaganda, recent research has demonstrated that people might distance from moderate 
groups with more permeable group boundaries and identify more with groups which have a 
stronger structure and less permeability (Frischlich, Rieger, Rutkowski, & Bente, 2015). Our 
results suggest that this effect might be even stronger under conditions of threats, such as 
uncertainty. Future research should therefore include a direct test of behavioral intentions, 
actions (like mobility from one group to another or sticking to the same group) and political 
participation (such as commenting behavior in social media forums, or posting of videos).  
Although the observed effects were small, the increasing amount of extremist 
propaganda on the internet (Glaser, 2013; Hussain & Saltman, 2014) and the high odds of 
being confronted with accordant messages (Rieger et al., 2013) makes them nonetheless 
relevant for practitioners. Moreover as the increased uncertainty in Europe following the 
Eurozone crisis (Reese & Lauenstein, 2014) and the current high number of refugees 
(UNHCR, 2014) are able to foster uncertainty in Europe. Our results suggest that these 
societal factors, when salient within an individual, might influence a person’s willingness to 
listen to right-wing populist messages and propaganda.  
Our results show that uncertainty and authoritarian attitudes work hand-in-hand 
increasing the effectiveness of extremist content. On the contrary, attempts to challenge 
extremist ideologies online, for instance via so-called counter-narratives (Briggs & Feve, 
2013) should therefore address uncertainties and the transmission of authoritarian attitudes 




Rieger; Frischlich & Bente: Propaganda in an insecure, unstructured world 
220 
Dafnos’ (2014) assumption that attempts to counter extremist ideologies need narratives 
offering the recipient alternative values and belief-systems. Particularly authoritarian sources 
transmitting peaceful values can foster peaceful instead of hostile inter-group attitudes under 
conditions of existential threats (Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009). As the found 
interaction effects suggest, authoritarianism therefore is not necessarily tied to a higher 
vulnerability for extremist groups and their propaganda but can also be tied to fostering 
counter-arguments that present a peaceful, but clearly structured message. 
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
Some limitations of the current work have to be mentioned. First of all, we examined 
only German males wherefore our results are not generalizable to other samples and women. 
However, prior research found comparable reactions among Muslims when confronted with 
extremist propaganda (Rieger et al., 2013) and no gender effects in the reactions of Germans 
towards right-wing extremist propaganda (Frischlich, Rieger, Hein, et al., 2015), or regarding 
the influence of uncertainty on the identification with entitative groups (Hogg et al., 2007). 
Nonetheless, a replication of our results in different samples would enhance confidence in this 
assumption. In a related vein, we examined a typical student sample. Although this limits the 
generalizability of our results to non-academic backgrounds (Hodson & Busseri, 2012), the 
observation of a decreased distancing among academics underlines the meaning of our 
findings. Prior research showed students to respond particularly negatively to extremist 
propaganda addressing them as in-group members (Rieger et al., 2013). Our study provided 
initial evidence that uncertainty is a relevant factor weakening this defense.  
Regarding our materials, we only used two extremist videos. Although we selected 
prototypical stimuli based on prior research, future studies addressing the role of different 
propaganda formats seems to be a fruitful venue for research. This seems also important when 
considering that the amount of explained variance in our analyses was rather low. That is, 
although the results indicate that aversion felt towards extremist videos and their perceived 
persuasiveness are related to authoritarianism and uncertainty, other variables that add to an 
explanation were seemingly not included. Therefore, the presented results do not provide a 
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In relation to this point, our design is not able to clarify the question whether the 
increase in identification under higher levels of uncertainty was in part due to an approach to 
the right-wing extremist material or could be interpreted as an avoidant/defense reaction 
against Islamic extremist materials. Since this appears to be an important question when 
unraveling the effectiveness of in- and out-group propaganda, future studies should draw on 
these initial findings and investigate the group-specific impacts.  
It has to be noted that our dependent variables focused on the initial responses towards 
extremist propaganda in terms of the aversion raised by the video and the perceived 
persuasiveness of its content, as well as the identification with the national group addressed 
by the propaganda. We did not measure actual behavior after the reception. Our findings are 
nonetheless meaningful as identification steers the behavioral intentions following the norms 
of one’s in-group (Terry & Hogg, 1996). Behavioral intentions are a good predictor for the 
actual behavior (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Research on social identity and the 
correspondence between attitude and behavior further demonstrates that the strongest 
correspondence between attitude and behavior exists when attitudes are normative and the 
groups people identify with are self-inclusive (Hogg & Smith, 2007). Nevertheless, future 
research examining the effects of identification on behavioral intentions and actual behavior is 
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